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 A B S T R A C T  
This research aims to evaluate the effect of family control, which is obtained through 
both direct or pyramidal ownership mechanism, and company performance. It also 
examines the mediating effect of founder leadership as represented by founding 
family members occupying the top management position and the effectiveness of 
Board of Commissioner. This study used Ordinary Least Square regression for the 
data analysis with 670 data as the sample from 134 sample companies from year 
2009 to 2013. The results show that family control through direct ownership me-
chanism enhances company performance (alignment effect). On the other hand, 
family control through pyramidal ownership mechanism weakens company perfor-
mance (entrenchment effect). The results also show that founder leadership boosts 
the alignment effect and limits the entrenchment effect. However, this research fails 
to confirm the role of the effectiveness of the Board of Commissioner in increasing 
the alignment effect and limiting the entrenchment effect.  
 
 A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengevaluasi pengaruh kontrol keluarga, yang dipe-
roleh melalui mekanisme kepemilikan langsung dan secara piramida, dan kinerja 
perusahaan. Penelitian ini juga menguji pengaruh mediasi kepemimpinan pendiri 
yang diwakili oleh anggota pendiri keluarga yang menduduki posisi manajemen 
puncak dan Efektifitas Dewan Komisaris. Ordinary Least Square Regression digu-
nakan untuk menganalisis data sampel 670 dari 134 perusahaan sampel dari 2009 
hingga 2013. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kontrol keluarga melalui meka-
nisme pemilikan langsung meningkatkan kinerja perusahaan (alignment effect). Di 
sisi lain, kontrol keluarga melalui mekanisme kepemilikan piramida melemahkan 
kinerja perusahaan (entrenchment effect). Hasil penelitian juga menunjukkan bah-
wa kepemimpinan pendiri meningkatkan efek keselarasan dan membatasi entrench-
ment effect. Namun, penelitian ini gagal untuk mengkonfirmasi peran efektivitas 
Dewan Komisaris dalam meningkatkan alignment effect dan membatasi entrench-
ment effect.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The difference of the company ownership structure 
is one of factors that makes agency problem varies 
among countries. For example, a dispersed owner-
ship is only found in countries with strong law en-
forcement over company’s owner, as argued by La 
Porta et. al. (1999). In general, companies in East 
Asia have concentrated ownership structure, which 
are ownership with cash flow rights and controlling 
rights held by certain parties, e.g. family, govern-
ment, public-owned financial institutions, etc. More 
than 50% companies in Indonesia have concen-
trated ownership structure o which the strongest 
control is on the hand of founding family (Diyanty 
2012) through pyramidal ownership mechanism. 
The family obtains controlling shares through 
both direct and indirect ownership mechanism 
such as the pyramidal structure. Control through 
the direct ownership is acquired by a simple own-
ership structure, whereas the control through py-
ramidal ownership mechanism that goes through a 
series of ownership chain in other companies (La 
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Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999). This 
pyramidal ownership allows a party to execute its 
control over a company with relatively lower own-
ership and investment percentages, thus the control 
rights of the controlling shareholders surpasses its 
cash flow rights (Claessens, et. al. 2000; Diyanty 
2012). 
Ownership and control by founding family en-
courage controlling shareholders to be deeply in-
volved in managing the company and even tend to 
carry out the expropriation of the non-controlling 
shareholders through the provision of overcom-
pensation towards family members who sit in the 
managerial positions, related-parties transactions 
or the enactment of policies on special dividend to 
controlling shareholders which, in this case, is fami-
ly (Andersen and Reebs 2003). Family as the largest 
controlling shareholders wants special dividend 
policies that will affect policies on company’s strat-
egy plans about business expansion, leading to 
poor operation and eventually will affect the stock 
price performance (Andersen and Reebs 2003). 
This condition triggers the agency conflict be-
tween controlling shareholders, which is assisted 
by management, and non-controlling shareholders. 
This condition is exacerbated when the controlling 
shareholder increases its control through the pyra-
mid structure by maintaining low number of hold-
ings (cash flow rights) but having greater control 
rights than the sum of its holdings, so as to encour-
age the emergence of entrenchment problems 
(Morck et al. 1988). 
The growing share ownership of the family on 
a company affects the improvement of the compa-
ny’s performance. Resources invested in the com-
pany becomes greater thus the risk of loss faced by 
the family becomes larger (Anderson and Reeb 
2003). In the direct ownership mechanism, greater 
the direct ownership of the family on a company 
lead to higher the alignment effect. This condition 
tends to discourage the family from expropriating 
the company (Fan and Wong 2002) and to enhance 
the socio emotional wealth of the family that moti-
vates them to maintain and develop the company 
(Gómez-Mejía, et.al. 2007). In the direct ownership 
mechanism, the amount of cash flow rights will be 
the same as the controlling rights on the company 
so that the controlling shareholders will not have 
the motivation to take action against the expropria-
tion of the non-controlling shareholders. 
On the other hand, the pyramidal ownership 
mechanism enables the family to gain control over 
a company with a relatively small investment, thus 
the family has larger control rights than the in-
vested amount and great difference between cash 
flow rights and control rights occurs (La Porta, Lo-
pez-de- Silanes and Shleifer 1999; Claessens, Djan-
kov, Fan and Lang 1999). Fan and Wong (2002) 
revealed that the difference in cash flow rights and 
control rights motivates the family in doing expro-
priation. Lower cash flows rights can reduce the 
risk of potential losses from expropriation. Through 
this ownership mechanism, controlling sharehold-
ers have the opportunity to use the company's re-
sources in order to satisfy personal interests so that 
the use of corporate resources is not optimal, which 
in turn gives impact on the performance of the 
company (Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung 2004). 
This condition referred to as negative entrenchment 
effect (Diyanty 2012). Expropriation carried out by 
controlling shareholders could potentially affect the 
value of the company. 
Although prior literature suggests that family 
ownership and control can lead to poor perfor-
mance, family influence can also provide competi-
tive advantage. Specifically, when the family pros-
perity is highly related to company prosperity. 
Family as the major controlling shareholders has a 
strong incentive to monitor managers thus will 
minimize free rider problem inherent with small 
atomistic shareholders. If monitoring required 
knowledge of the firm technology, family potential-
ly provides superior oversight because their leng-
thy tenure permits them to move further along the 
firms learning curve (Andersen and Reebs 2003). 
Provided that the largest control is on the hand 
of the founder family, they will put themselves as 
main leaders of the company (Peng and Jiang 2010). 
Claessens et al. (2000) found that most of compa-
nies in Asian countries are controlled by family. 
The CEOs of about 60 percent companies of which 
ownership is concentrated on family, are people 
who have family relations with controlling share-
holders. The placement of family members on the 
company’s main leadership positions is an attempt 
or a strategy to align family’s goals with company’s 
management (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Peng and 
Jiang 2010). Eventually family control will affect the 
company’s performance (Peng and Jiang 2010; 
Chung and Chan 2012). 
Andersen and Reebs (2003) argued that family 
control obtained through direct and indirect own-
ership would generate a greater positive impact 
when the CEO is a member of founding family. The 
reason for this is that company founder has higher 
sense of belonging and socio emotional wealth that 
motivate them to maintain the sustainability of the 
company. 
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In order to limit expropriation by controlling 
shareholders, adequate capital market regulations, 
accounting standards as well as corporate gover-
nance mechanisms are needed. Board of Commis-
sioners (BOC) play an important roles in overseeing 
and ensuring the implementation of good corporate 
governance. The surveillance has to be able to en-
sure protection of stakeholders rights. The over-
sight function performed by BOC is also enhanced 
through issuance of the Indonesia Financial Servic-
es Authority Regulation No. 33/POJK.04/2014 on 
Board of Directors and Board of Commissioner of 
Issuing or Public Company. This regulation man-
dates at least 30 percent of the total members of 
BOC of a public company must be independent1. 
The presence of the independent member is ex-
pected to enhance the effectiveness of oversight 
function performed by the BOC over the board of 
directors. Eventually, it is expected to limit the 
chance of improper expropriation upon non-
controlling shareholders. 
The researcher believes that this study is bene-
ficial when conducted in Indonesia setting because 
ownership structure in this country is largely dom-
inated by family ownership. Diyanty (2012) and 
Ulupui (2009) found there was 88 percent, among 
public companies in Indonesia, that were owned by 
the family of which members were appointed as 
director and or commissioner. The findings support 
previous research by Lukviarman (2004) which 
states that 80 percent of companies in Indonesia 
experienced family interference in management 
positions as well as commissioners. The dominance 
of controlling ownership by the family triggered 
the intense agency conflict between controlling 
family and non-controlling shareholders. 
This study is expected to serve as a set of refer-
ence for the regulators in increasing their role in: (i) 
improving its surveillance in the capital market 
through rules on the implementation of good cor-
porate governance and rules aimed to improve the 
effectiveness of the board of commissioner, (ii) im-
proving the monitoring mechanism in order to 
provide protection upon investors and non-
controlling shareholders. The results are also ex-
pected to provide considerations in the issuance of 
policies on the disclosure of the ultimate ownership 
chain in the financial statement. The disclosure is 
____________ 
 
1 The independent board of commissioners is a party without 
financial, organization, ownership, or family relationship with 
the other board of commissioner members, directors, or control-
ling shareholders or other relationship, which influence their 
ability to perform their tasks independently (Regulations of 
Bank of Indonesia No 8/4/PBI/2006). 
expected to provide an overview on the largest 
controlling shareholders and whether these share-
holders obtained their control through direct or 
pyramidal ownership mechanism. The disclosure is 
also important in providing an overview on the 
control carried out by the controlling shareholders 
over several companies in the same control. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESES 
Ownership Structure and Agency Conflict 
One of the factors that causes agency conflict is 
company’s ownership structure. The presence of 
asymmetric information between managers and 
shareholders as well as the difference of interests 
between managers and shareholders allow manag-
ers as agents to take decisions contrary to the own-
er’s personal goals. 
There is a condition when agents do not al-
ways act in the best interests of the shareholders, as 
a consequence of agency relationship (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). This situation could happen when 
agents have better information than shareholders 
and act to maximize their own interests at the ex-
pense of shareholders which is called expropria-
tion. Expropriation is defined as the use of authori-
ty over the control to maximize the welfare of their 
own and take over the wealth of others, especially 
the wealth of shareholders (Claessens et al. 2000). 
Agency conflict between shareholders and 
management arise in countries with dispersed 
ownership structure characteristics such as the US 
and UK (Jensen and Meckling 1976). La Porta et al. 
(1999), Claessen et al. (1999) and Diyanty (2012) 
suggest that with highly-concentrated ownership 
structure evident in Asia (including Indonesia), the 
agency problem that occurs is no longer between 
management and shareholders, but between the 
controlling shareholders (as agent) assisted by 
management and the non-controlling shareholders. 
In the concentrated ownership structure, manage-
ment represents controlling shareholder. 
Control over a company can be obtained 
through two ownership mechanisms, direct and 
pyramidal ownership (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer 1999; Claessens, Djankov and Lang 
2000). Control through direct ownership mechan-
ism is obtained by direct equity investment in a 
company (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer 
1999). With the direct ownership mechanism, con-
trol rights held by shareholders is equal with the 
amount invested in the company, thus there would 
be no difference between cash flow rights and con-
trol rights of shareholders. The higher the invest-
Vera Diyanty: Does the pyramidal ownership … 
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ment is, the higher the commitment of the control-
ling shareholders in increasing company value. 
This condition is called alignment effect. A cash 
flow right is financial claims of shareholders on 
their investment in the company. While the control 
rights are voting rights to participate in decision 
making process in determining the policy of the 
company. Control obtained through pyramid own-
ership mechanism goes through a series of owner-
ship chain in other companies (Almeida and Wol-
fenzon 2006). Control obtained through the pyra-
midal mechanism is a series of complex ownership 
and allows the voting rights held by the controlling 
shareholders to exceed their cash flow rights 
(Chung and Chan 2012). 
Claessens et al. (1999) and Diyanty (2012) 
found that 71.5 percent of total companies in Indo-
nesia are controlled by family and 66.9 percent con-
trolling shareholders of companies in Indonesia 
tend to have voting rights or control rights that 
exceeds their cash flow rights through pyramidal 
ownership structure (Claessens et al. 2000; Diyanty 
(2012). Through the pyramidal ownership mechan-
ism, controlling shareholders have direct control 
over the company while at the same time they also 
have control over some other companies that even-
tually forms a common way in controlling the non-
controlling shareholders by separating control 
rights from cash flow rights (Claessens et al. 2000; 
Faccio and Lang 2002). This condition potentially 
leads to negative entrenchment through actions 
which could harm non-controlling shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
The separation of ownership and control is 
more evident in companies controlled by the family 
and in small-scale companies. Claessens et al. 
(2000) concluded when there is a considerable dif-
ference between control rights and cash flow rights 
(wedge) through the pyramidal ownership me-
chanism and when the major controlling share-
holder is family, then the level of the expropriation 
of the non-controlling shareholders would be high-
er. 
One of ways to eliminate entrenchment prob-
lem from the controlling shareholders is to increase 
ownership of the controlling shareholders or even 
through the go-private decision. Higher ownership 
(cash flow rights) by the controlling shareholders 
lead to higher commitment and enhancement or 
alignment of interest between controlling and non-
controling shareholders (Gomes 2000). This condi-
tion is called alignment effect (Fan and Wong 2002) 
or Positive Incentive Effect (Yeh 2005). 
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) found that as 
consequences of pyramidal ownership structure is 
that the companies involved in the pyramidal struc-
ture operate in different industries with the con-
trolled companies. In addition, the value and the 
performance of the affiliated companies controlled 
through pyramidal ownership structure are lower 
than the value and the performance of non-
affiliated companies. Moreover, the research also 
indicates that when additional affiliated companies 
were added into the pyramidal structure in the 
family business group, the non-controlling share-
holders faced negative return. Therefore, the pyra-
midal ownership structure has negative implica-
tions toward the company and the non-controlling 
shareholders. 
 
Family Company 
Chua et al. (1999), and Liu, et al. (2010) define a 
family company as family ownership, control over 
voting rights, involvement of family in managerial 
positions, and control over election of board of 
commissioner and board of directors. Diyanty 
(2012) concluded that a family company is a com-
pany whose major ultimate control is on the hand 
of family (one person or a group of people who 
have family relationship). The control is obtained 
both through direct ownership or pyramidal own-
ership mechanism and through direct involvement 
of family in company management. 
The involvement of company founder are in 
the top managerial position. These founding family 
members hasve a strategy to increase their control 
over the company (Peng and Jiang 2010). The 
greater control rights owned by family lead to 
higher power to align family goals with the goals of 
the company and the management. This is possible 
because they family members who sit at the top 
managerial positions have a broad access to the 
utilization of company resources. In addition, the 
controlling family has a broader investment hori-
zon that will provide benefits for the company (Liu, 
Yang and Zhang 2010; James 1999). 
The placement of founding family also main-
tains a long-term presence in the company. Casson 
(1999) argued that founding family views the com-
pany as an asset to be passed on their descendants 
rather than wealth to be consumed during their 
lifetimes. Therefore, company survival is an impor-
tant concern for the family, suggesting they advo-
cate long-term value maximization. 
Morck, et al. (1988) suggests that founder CEO 
brings innovative and value-enhancing expertise to 
the company. Davis et al. (1997) explains that fami-
ly members act as stewards and as such identify 
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strongly with the firm and view company perfor-
mance as an extension of their own wellbeing. An-
dersen et al. (2003) supports this notion by conclud-
ing that the presence of family in company mana-
gerial positions will give incentive to keep compa-
ny reputation in order to enhance company per-
formance. 
Higher controlling power obtained with direct 
ownership mechanism lead to higher motivation 
for controlling shareholders to keep their socio-
emotional wealth and thus reduce the incentive for 
expropriation. This occurs because expropriation 
has an economic burden for the family (Fan & 
Wong 2002). Hence, higher ownership by control-
ling shareholders through direct ownership me-
chanism leads to higher motivation to enhance 
company performance. Appointing member of 
founding family as company top managerial posi-
tions enable the controlling shareholders to take 
strategic decisions in order to enhance company 
performance (alignment effect). 
 
Board of Commissioners 
The Board of Commissioners (BOC) is responsible 
for supervising and advising the board of directors. 
In carrying out its oversight function, the BOC is 
also responsible for monitoring the board of direc-
tors as well as managers so their performance will 
be in accordance with the interests of both control-
ling and non-controlling. BOC also serves to pro-
vide advice and recommendations in order to im-
prove management performance (Public Company 
Law No. 40 of 2007). The effectiveness of BOC will 
benefit the company. 
The presence of BOC in company structure is a 
form of adherence to the sixth OECD principle2. 
The last OECD principle states that good corporate 
governance should ensure the availability of stra-
tegic guidance for the company, the effective over-
sight over managers by the BOC, and each of BOC 
and board of directors is accountable to the compa-
ny and shareholders. 
Based on the Regulations of Indonesia Finan-
cial Services Authority No 33/POJK.04/2014, the 
number of BOC in a company must be at least two 
people, with either one must be appointed as the 
BOC chairman. The chairman task is as primus 
inter pares, which is to coordinate BOC activities. 
____________ 
 
2 OECD has six corporate governance principles: (1) To ensure 
the effective corporate governance foundation, (2) To ensure 
shareholders’ rights and important functions in ownership, (3) 
Equal treatment upon all shareholders, (4) Stakeholders’ roles in 
corporate governance, (6) Disclosure and transparency, (6) 
BOC’s and BOD’s responsibilities. 
Each BOC member, including the chairman, holds 
equal level of position. 
 
The Effect of Family Control on Company Per-
formance 
Higher family ownership indicates higher cash 
flow rights and control rights owned by controlling 
shareholders, which leads to the higher socio-
emotional wealth of the family and helps to stabil-
ize company business. Larger shares owned by 
family means higher commitment over resources 
that was invested in the company (Anderson and 
Reeb 2003). This condition signals the existence of 
the alignment effect. The presence of alignment 
effect and the high commitment from the family as 
controlling shareholders have positive impacts on 
company’s performance through expropriation cost 
channel (Fan and Wong 2002). Therefore the first 
hypothesis is: 
H1: Higher the family ownership leads to better 
company performance. 
The family control rights obtained through py-
ramidal ownership mechanism allows a company 
to have control rights that exceeds cash flow rights 
and triggers the negative entrenchment effect (Fan 
and Wong 2002; Claessens S, Djankov, Fan and 
Lang 1999). Control rights obtained through pyra-
midal ownership mechanism allows family as the 
major controlling shareholders to use company 
resources to satisfy their own interests, leading to 
company poor performance (Morck, Wolfenzon 
and Yeung 2004). Based on this argument, control 
rights obtained through pyramidal ownership me-
chanism would generate a negative effect on com-
pany performance, so called entrenchment effect. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is: 
H2: Higher family control rights obtained through 
pyramidal ownership mechanism lead to poorer 
company performance. 
Appointing company founder at the top ma-
nagerial positions or the CEO means that the CEO 
has higher motivation to maintain company per-
formance. Behind this argument is that when the 
founders sit at the top managerial positions, agency 
conflict between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders would be limited. The controlling 
shareholders can easily align their own goals with 
company goals (Claessens, et al. 1999). The compa-
ny founders would try to keep their socio-
emotional wealth by maintaining the company sus-
tainability (Andersen and Reeb 2003). The place-
ment of founding family as the ultimate decision 
maker makes it easier to align family goals and 
company goals. 
Vera Diyanty: Does the pyramidal ownership … 
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Based on the argument it can be concluded 
that having founding family members placed at 
company top managerial positions are expected to 
strengthen the positive impact of family control 
rights through direct ownership and weaken the 
negative impact of family control through pyra-
midal ownership mechanism on company perfor-
mance. Therefore the third hypothesis is: 
H3: Having family members at the top managerial 
positions strengthen (weaken) positive (negative) 
effect of direct (indirect) ownership mechanism on 
company performance. 
Board of Commissioners is responsible to over-
see company policies taken by the board of direc-
tors and assess the current company performance. 
With a good quality oversight function, the BOS is 
expected to enhance the positive (negative) impact 
of family control through direct (indirect) owner-
ship mechanism on company performance. The 
effective BOC will oversee company management, 
which resulted in enhancement of management 
performance and broaden management strategic 
view with their knowledge. Therefore the fourth 
hypothesis is: 
H4: Effective BOC will enhance (weaken) the posi-
tive (negative) relationship between family control 
through direct (indirect) ownership mechanism on 
company performance. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Research Framework 
This research analyzes the hypotheses using the 
underlying framework as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Types and Sources of Data 
This research used secondary data from the com-
pany ownership structure, company leadership 
structure, the board of commissioners, and com-
pany performance. This research used company 
annual reports as primary data source to identify 
family ownership within a company. The annual 
reports were obtained from Thomson Reuters Ei-
kon, Indonesia Stock Exchange, and the company 
website. In the case that data of ultimate control-
ling shareholder could not be obtained from the 
annual reports, this research used data from the 
Department of General Law Administration, Min-
istry of Justice and Human Rights of the Republic 
of Indonesia to identify the ultimate owners of the 
company. The annual reports were also used to 
gather the data of company leadership, the effec-
tiveness of the board of directors, and the age of 
the company. To determine whether the main 
leaders of the company are a founder or member 
of the family controlling the company, data of 
family relationships from a study by Diyanty 
(2012) was used. 
 
Population and Sample 
Population for this research is all companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2009 until 
2013. The sample selection method is purposive 
sampling based on following criteria: 
1. The company is in the non-financial industries 
2. The company has annual financial statements in 
IDR. 
3. The company does not have negative equity 
during the observation period. 
4. The company is listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during the study period is 2009 to 
2013 (never delisted, suspended, or go private 
during the study period. 
5. The company does not engage in corporate con-
trol action, such as mergers, acquisitions, dives-
titures during the study period. 
6. Non-State Owned Enterprises. 
7. The company is not categorized as ASTINDO3 
____________ 
 
3 Companies that are included in the ASTINDO category are 
companies of which the ultimate owners are foreign entities but 
in practice are still controlled by the Indonesian founding fami-
ly. This practice is prevalent after the economic crisis in 1997 and 
1998 when many original owners/founding family who once 
controlled the company were prohibited to own the shares of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Research Framework 
Control Rights of Ultimate 
Controlling Shareholder: 
Direct Ownership 
Pyramidal Ownership 
 
Company Performance 
 
Founding Families CEO 
Effectiveness of Board of 
Commissioners 
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company. 
The 134 sample companies were found to have 
fulfilled all the criteria so that the total data obser-
vation from year 2009 until 2013 was 670 data sam-
ple. Summary of sample companies’ selection is 
available in Table 1. 
 
Data Analysis Techniques 
This research applied Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression models to analyze the data. Since the 
data for this research is a combination of time series 
data and cross section data, this research applied 
data panel analysis. The regression model used 
control variables to controls other company charac-
teristics that may affect performance. The characte-
ristics are size of the company, age of the company, 
and leverage of the company. 
 
Research Model 
Following equation is the research model to test H1 
and H2: 
ROAit or PBVit = α + β1D-Ownit + β2P-Ownit + 
β3Founder-CEOit + β4BOCit + β5Sizeit + β6Ageit + 
β7Leverageit + ε. (1) 
Following equation is the research model to 
test H3 and H4: 
ROAit or PBVit = α + β1D-Ownit + β2P-Ownit + 
β3Founder-CEOit + β4BOCit + β5Founder-CEOit*D-
Ownit + β6Founder-CEOit*P-Ownit + β7BOCit*D-
Ownit + β8BOCit*P-Ownit + β9Sizeit + β10Ageit + 
β11Leverageit + ε.  (2) 
 
                                                                                             
 
company. Consequently, the original owners attempted to re-
gain control over their company through restructuring (Kim 
2003). The original owners bought the company shares using 
foreign entities that they established or bought for that specific 
purpose. These foreign entities were established in countries that 
do not require companies to report the sources of funding and 
ownership structure such as British Virgin Islands or Mauritius 
(Kim 2003). The ASTINDO companies is identified based on 
data from the Business Data Centre Indonesia. 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of sample 
companies. From 2009 to 2013, the majority or fami-
ly owners gained controls through indirect owner-
ship mechanism such as pyramidal ownership 
structure. Only 11% of the sample companies are 
controlled by family through direct ownership me-
chanism. The data were in accordance with argu-
ment presented Almeida and Wolfenzon  (2006) 
and Diyanty (2012) in their research. They indicate 
that family would prefer to gain control of the 
company through pyramidal ownership mechan-
ism. Weak investor protection in several countries, 
especially countries in Asia, enables family to ap-
plied this mechanism. 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of data 
sample. Data shows that family control through di-
rect ownership in average has a value of 0.528 with a 
maximum value of 0.918. The median-value of 0 
indicates that half of the family company is not con-
trolled through direct ownership. The result is align 
with the results shown by Table 3 which shows the 
company controlled by the direct ownership is no 
more than 11.2% of total sample company. 
In contrast, the data of control rights gained 
through pyramidal ownership mechanism of the 
ownership of the pyramid shows higher trend. 
Control rights gained through pyramidal owner-
ship mechanism has an average value of 48% with 
maximum value of more than 90%. The median 
value of control rights gained through pyramidal 
ownership is 0.533, which indicates that family 
with pyramids ownership of more than 52.39% 
controls more than half of sample companies. It can 
be concluded that high control rights is largely 
gained by the controlling family through pyramidal 
ownership mechanism. This result is consistent 
with those presented in Table 3. 
Based on the data observations, founder family 
still held leading positions as managing director or 
Table 1 
Selection of the Companies for the Sample 
No. Criteria of the Samples Total 
1 Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013 453 
2 Companies in financial industry 79 
3 Companies that have negative equity 7 
4 Non-state-owned companies reporting financial statements in foreign currency 59 
5 Companies of which ownership cannot be traced ownership and are not listed on stock 
exchanges in consecutive year 2009-2013 
41 
6 Companies controlled by the government 24 
7 Companies controlled by foreign entities and companies categorized as ASTINDO 109 
The number of samples companies 134 
Source: Developed from the sample observations. 
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CEO in 40.3% of sample companies. Meanwhile, the 
relative score of BOC effectiveness is on average 0.63 
with median score of 0.69. The score means that the 
on average sample companies answer yes to around 
39 out of 63 questions about BOC effectiveness. The 
median score of 0.691 and maximum score of 0.798 
indicate that in more than half of the sample compa-
nies, the BOC was not yet effective in performing 
their supervisory roles. The data shows that signifi-
cant number of sample companies owned by the 
family is led by founder family members and have 
BOC that are not sufficiently effective. 
Table 4 also shows the characteristics of sample 
companies in term of the company age, size, and 
leverage. Regarding the age, the average age of 
sample companies is 27 years old while the 
Table 2 
The Operational of Variables 
Independent Variables 
Company 
performance 
This variable measure company’s performance using ROA (accounting performance) and 
PBV (market to book value) as proxy. ROA is measured as net income divided by total 
assets. 
Dependent Variables 
D-Own This variable is measured in percentage of control rights through direct family ownership. 
Total control that were obtained by the family through direct ownership (Chung and Chan 
2012). 
P-Own This variable measure control through the pyramidal ownership mechanism. Firstly, 
the ultimate owners of the sample company were identified. Subsequently, familial 
relationship between ultimate owners with other shareholders was identified to determine 
how much control the family group has through pyramidal ownership structure. This step is 
necessary since shareholders that had an alliance (i.e. family relationship) would take 
collective decisions in order to align their interests (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
1999). Family was considered to had control of a company through pyramidal ownership 
structure if the control gained by the family through ownership in the company’s 
institutional shareholders was higher that the control gained by the family through direct 
ownership of the company. This variable is measured in percentage of control rights gained 
through pyramidal ownership structure. 
Moderation Variables 
Founder-CEO This variable measures the involvement of the founder family shareholders in the company 
operation. Founder of the company occupying leadership position company is expected to 
have a positive impact on business performance because it can mitigate the agency conflict 
between shareholders and the company's management due to the alignment of management 
goals and family goals that create a socio-emotional wealth (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Liu, 
Yang, and Zhang 2010). To measure the involvement, proxy of founder family member 
occupying company leader position such as managing director or CEO serve as proxy 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003). This variable is a dummy variable: 1 (one) if the company’s 
founder family occupies a leading position within the company, and 0 (zero) if others. 
BOC This variable measures the effectiveness of the board of commissioners. This research adopts 
the scoring for effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners in the ASEAN Corporate 
Governance Scorecard that is issued by the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum (ACMF). A part 
of the scorecard, the responsibility of board, consists of 74 questions within five main 
aspects: board duties and responsibility, board structure, board processes, people of the 
board and board performance. The questions are yes or no type of questions. 
The scorecard measures the performance of Board of Directors (BOD) and Board of 
Commissioners (BOC). Since this research aim to evaluate the effectiveness of BOC, the 
questions that were not related to the BOC were omitted. To measure the effectiveness of 
BOC, a yes answer was given a value of 1 and no was given a value of 0. The maximum 
score of BOC effectiveness was 63 and the minimum was 0. Higher score indicate higher 
BOC effectiveness in performing its supervisory function. This variable is measured in 
relative score of the sample company BOC effectiveness toward the maximum score of 63. 
Control Variables 
Size The size of the company that is measured by the normal logarithm of the company's total 
assets at the end of the year. 
Age The age of the company is measured in years since the company was established. 
Leverage  Leverage is measured by total debt divided by total assets. 
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youngest company is only 3 years old and oldest 
company reach 107 years old. The median age of 
sample company is 26 years, which means half of 
the sample companies used has been in operation 
for more than 26 years. The age of the sample com-
pany is highly varied as shown by the high stan-
dard deviation value of 14 years. Regarding the size 
of sample companies that were measured by the 
natural logarithm of the total assets, the average 
value is 20.9884 with a standard deviation of 1.648. 
Meanwhile the leverage, which is the ratio of long-
term debt to total assets, of sample companies has 
an average value of 0.149 with a standard deviation 
of 0.273. The median leverage value is 0.075, which 
means that more than half of sample companies 
had relatively low ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets at less than 0.075. The data indicated that 
majority of sample companies were not dependent 
on funding from debt. 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
This research applied regression with robust stan-
dard errors. Result of the regression analysis is 
shown in Table 5 and Table 6. Table 5 shows the 
result of model (1) and (2) with accounting perfor-
mance as dependent variable. Accounting perfor-
mance was represented by ROA ratio. Table 6 
shows the result of model (1) and (2) with market 
performance as dependent variable. Market per-
formance was represented by ratio of stock market 
value to book value (PBV). The result shows that 
both model (1) and model (2) were significant at 
99% confidence level. It means that in overall the 
model was reliable to explain the variances in de-
pendent variable, either the accounting perfor-
mance or market performance. 
 
The Effect of Direct Ownership on Corporate Per-
formance 
Table 5 and Table 6 show significant positive result 
for direct ownership variable when tested using 
both the accounting performance and market per-
formance as dependent variable. This result indi-
cates that proposed hypothesis of positive effect of 
the control rights by controlling family gained 
through direct ownership to company performance 
is confirmed. It provide an evidence that direct 
ownership trigger alignment effect between con-
trolling shareholders which is assisted by company 
management and non-controlling shareholders. 
The alignment effect enable them to work together 
to improve the company's performance. 
This result supports the results of research 
conducted by Chung and Chan (2012), which con-
cluded the higher family control through direct 
ownership mechanism boost the company's per-
formance. The high control rights obtained through 
direct ownership ensure that controlling sharehold-
ers and company management were committed to 
enhance the value of the company and develop the 
company's business (Gómez-Mejía, et al. 2007). 
Controlling shareholders had high commitment to 
improve the performance of the company since the 
direct control was acquired using significant in-
Table 3 
Type of Family Control 
Type Control 
2009-2013 
Amount Percentage 
Controlled directly 14 11.19% 
Controlled indirectly 120 88.08% 
Source: Computed from data observations . 
 
Table 4 
Summary of Data Sample 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
ROA 670 0.054 0.157 -1.729 0.058 0.517 
PBV 670 1.863 1.875 0.152 1.079 15.543 
D-Own 670 0.528 0.210 0 0 0.918 
P-Own 670 0.488 0.239 0 0.533 0.972 
BOC 670 0.630 0.292 0 0.691 0.798 
Age 670 27.870 14.518 3 26 107 
Size 670 20.988 1.648 15.441 21.119 25.065 
Leverage 670 0.149 0.273 0 0.075 3.429 
Founder-CEO = 40.356 % 
Non-Founder-CEO = 59.644% 
Source: Computed from data observations.  
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vestment so that controlling shareholders was high 
ly motivated to oversee the performance of compa-
ny management that would ultimately improve the 
company performance. 
 
The Effect of Pyramidal Ownership on Company 
Performance 
Table 5 and Table 6 show significant negative result 
for pyramidal ownership variable when tested us-
ing either the accounting performance or market 
performance as dependent variable. The results 
confirm the hypothesis that control rights gained 
through pyramidal ownership structure have sig-
nificant negative effect on company performance. 
Results of this research provide evidence to the 
argument that the family owners who controls the 
company through pyramidal ownership structure 
tends to expropriate (Claessens, Djankov, Fan and 
Lang 1999). The pyramidal ownership mechanism 
enable the family owners to gain strong control of 
the company with relatively small investment 
which lead to differences between the cash flow 
rights and the voting rights or the control rights 
owned by the family owners (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer 1999; Claessens, Djankov, Fan 
and Lang 2002). The differences means that the risk 
of loss borne by the family through pyramidal 
ownership is smaller when compared to risk of loss 
borne by the family through direct ownership and 
consequently the family would have higher motiva-
tion to expropriate (Claessens, Djankov, Fan and 
Lang 2002). Expropriation done by the family 
would cause suboptimal utilization of company 
resources that would adversely affect the perfor-
mance of the company (Morck, Wolfenzon and 
Yeung 2004). 
The performance of the company is also af-
fected by the risk that is borne by the company. 
Control rights obtained through direct ownership 
structures require relatively large investment so 
that the risk of loss borne by the family is larger 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003). Consequently, the fami-
ly would lead the company to be conservative and 
only take on projects that have low risk with rela-
tively smaller returns (Ben-Amar and Andre 2006). 
On the other hand, pyramidal ownership structures 
enabled the family to gain control with relatively 
low investment so that the risk borne by the family 
is lower (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
1999). Therefore, the family would direct the com-
pany to choose project that have higher risk to get 
additional higher revenues as well. However, high-
er risk projects also poses higher risk of loss for the 
company. 
Table 5 
Regression Result with Accounting Performance as Dependent Variable 
Model (1) 
ROAit = α + β1D-Ownit + β2P-Ownit + β3Founder-CEOit + β4BOCit + β5Sizeit + β6Ageit + β7Leverageit + ε 
Model (1): Prob. F = 0.0076; R-Squared = 0. 31812 
 
Model (2) 
ROAit = α + β1D-Ownit + β2P-Ownit + β3Founder-CEOit + β4BOCit + β5Founder-CEOit*D-Ownit + β6Founder-
CEOit*P-Ownit + β7BOCit*D-Ownit + β8BOCit*P-Ownit + β9Sizeit + β10Ageit + β11Leverageit + ε 
Model (2): Prob. F = 0.005; R-Squared = 0. 2875 
Variables Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coef Prob Coef Prob 
Constants 
 
-0.134 0.056 -0.34 0.056 
D-Own + 0.251* 0.075 0.242* 0.053 
P-Own - -0.153* 0.066 -0.450* 0.086 
Founder-CEO + 0.012** 0.020 0.433** 0.015 
Founder-CEO*D-Own + 
  
0.544*** 0.001 
Founder-CEO*P-Own + 
  
0.243*** 0.007 
BOC + 0.016** 0.034 0.056** 0.046 
BOC*D-Own + 
  
0.567 0.899 
BOC*P-Own + 
  
0.345 0.556 
Age + 0.001** 0.0291 0.456 * 0.078 
Size + 0.023 0.870 0.548 0.651 
Leverage - -0.113** 0.0166 -0.245 * 0.056 
***Significant at the 1% level (p≤0.01); **Significant at the level of 5% (p≤0.05); *Significant at 10% (p≤0.1). 
Source: Computed from data observations 
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The Moderation Effect of Founder Leadership 
The third hypothesis in this research is that the 
moderating effects of founder leadership to the 
effect of family control on company performance. 
This research argue that founder leadership in-
crease the alignment effect and decrease the entren-
chment effect of family control on company per-
formance. The results of model (2) in Table 5 and 
Table 6 shows that the moderation effect of founder 
leadership to direct ownership and the moderation 
effect of founder leadership to pyramidal owner-
ship is significant and positive. The result confirms 
that the founder family occupying principal direc-
tor or CEO position of the company strengthen the 
alignment effect and reduce the entrenchment ef-
fect of family control on corporate performance. 
Placing the founder of company in a top man-
agement position strengthen the motivation of 
company leaders to maintain the company perfor-
mance. In addition, having the founder of the com-
pany in the top management position reduce the 
agency conflict between controlling shareholders 
and non-controlling shareholders since occupying 
the top management position enable the founder 
family as the controlling shareholders to easily 
align its objectives with company goals (Claessens, 
et al. 1999). Founder of the company have high so-
cio-emotional wealth connection with the company 
so that he will be continuously motivated to devel-
op and improve the performance of the company, 
which would ultimately enhance shareholders val-
ue. 
Founder of the company will also strive to 
maintain its socio-emotional wealth by maintaining 
the continuity of the business (Andersen and Reeb 
2003). Placement of members of the founder family 
as the main leader of the company, which is the top 
position in determining the policies taken by the 
company, facilitates the family to maintain its so-
cio-emotional wealth. Another benefit of founder of 
the company occupying main leadership position 
of the company is that it provides unique access to 
the resources needed by the company through rela-
tionships with beneficial parties and wider invest-
ment horizon that benefit for the company (Liu, 
Yang and Zhang 2010; James 1999). 
However, by restricting the leadership posi-
tion of the company to the founder of the compa-
ny or to members of founder family, it narrows 
the possibilities for the company to obtain higher 
quality corporate leaders who did not come from 
the family (Anderson and Reeb 2003). This could 
give the company a competitive disadvantage in 
the future. 
Table 6 
 Regression Result with Market Performance as Dependent Variable 
Model (1) 
PBVit = α + β1D-Ownit + β2P-Ownit + β3Founder-CEOit + β4BOCit + β5Sizeit + β6Ageit + β7Leverageit + ε 
Model (1): Prob. 00 F = 0.00 ; R-Squared = 0.2241 
 
Model (2) 
PBVit = α + β1D-Ownit + β2P-Ownit + β3Founder-CEOit + β4BOCit + β5Founder-CEOit*D-Ownit + β6Founder-
CEOit*P-Ownit + β7BOCit*D-Ownit + β8BOCit*P-Ownit + β9Sizeit + β10Ageit + β11Leverageit + ε 
Model (2): Prob. 00 F = 0.00 ; R-Squared = 0.1762 
Variables Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coef Prob Coef Prob 
Constants 
 
-0.254 0.456 -0.435 0.087 
D-Own + 0.015* 0.017 0.765** 0.025 
P-Own - -0.167*** 0.001 -0.766** 0.016 
Founder-CEO + 0.011* 0.062 0.542* 0.074 
Founder-CEO*D-Own + 
  
0.542* 0.067 
Founder-CEO*P-Own + 
  
0.786* 0.096 
BOC + 0.654** 0.023 0.086 0.45 
BOC*D-Own + 
  
0.542 0.654 
BOC*P-Own + 
  
0.732 0.321 
Age + 0.021*** 0.00291 0.167*** 0.001 
Size + 0.56 0.621 0.823 0.154 
Leverage - 0 342 0.0752 0.986 0.078 
***Significant at the 1% level (p≤0.01); **Significant at the level of 5% (p≤0.05); *Significant at 10% (p≤0.1) 
Source: Computed from data observations. 
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The Moderation Effect of BOC Effectiveness 
Board of Commissioners is an important part for 
the implementation of good corporate governance 
and is expected to provide oversight and advice to 
support the performance of the management of the 
company as stated in the Company Act of 2007. 
This research attempted to see how the role of the 
Board of Commissioners through its supervisory 
function could improve alignment effect and re-
duce the entrenchment effect. 
The results of model (2) in Table 5 and Table 6 
shows that the moderation effect of BOC effective-
ness to direct ownership and the moderation effect 
of founder leadership to pyramidal ownership is 
not significant. The results indicate that effective-
ness of the Board of Commissioners in performing 
its supervisory function is not confirmed to in-
crease alignment effect and reduce entrenchment 
effect. One explanation is in Indonesia there are no 
rules ort code of corporate governance practices 
that explicitly state the obligation of BOC to devel-
op performance indicators or to approve certain 
company transactions. The World Bank in the re-
port of corporate governance practices in Indonesia 
in 2010 reports this issue. In addition, Annual Gen-
eral Meeting, which was dominated by family 
owners as the major shareholders with higher vote, 
appointed the Board of Directors as well as the 
Board of Commissioners. Therefore, the ability of 
Board of Commissioners to oversee the actions of 
the family owners and the company management is 
limited. It means that the Board of Commissioners 
cannot reduce the negative impact of the family 
control either through direct ownership or through 
the pyramidal ownership on company perfor-
mance. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
This research was conducted to examine the effect of 
family as controlling shareholders to company per-
formance. This research differentiates between fami-
ly control acquired through direct ownership me-
chanism and family control acquired through pyra-
midal ownership structure. This research is impor-
tant because most companies (over 50%) in Indone-
sia are controlled by family (Claessens et al. 2000; 
Diyanty 2012). Results of this research on the impact 
of family control through direct ownership on com-
pany performance shows that results that family 
control through direct ownership mechanism posi-
tively influence the performance of the company. On 
the other hand, family control through pyramidal 
ownership mechanism is confirmed to have negative 
effect on the company performance. Both proxies of 
company performance, which are accounting per-
formance and market performance, show the same 
result. The negative effect is significant enough to 
signify the importance of the information about the 
pyramidal ownership structure toward investors 
and non-controlling shareholders. Therefore, this 
information should be disclosed. 
This study also examined how leadership of 
the founding family and the effectiveness of the 
board of directors affect the relationship. The re-
search found that founder of the company occupy-
ing main director or CEO position was confirmed 
to improve the alignment effect that occurs when 
family control the company through direct owner-
ship mechanism. Founder leadership was also con-
firmed to decrease the negative entrenchment nega-
tive that the family control obtained through pyra-
midal ownership structure on company perfor-
mance. This result provide an evidence that while 
appointing founder or member of founder family 
as CEO or president director might have disadvan-
tages, the benefit is also apparent and significant. 
Therefore, regulators, investors, and non-
controlling shareholders should consider the ap-
pointment of founder or member of founder family 
as an option to ensure the family as controlling 
shareholder would take appropriate actions to en-
sure the maintenance of company value and the 
continuity of the business. 
The examination of the role of the Board of 
Commissioners effectiveness indicated that Board of 
Commissioners was unable to affect alignment and 
entrenchment effect of family control to company 
performance. The result signify the need to improve 
the role of Board of Commissioners in ensuring that 
the management (which in some cases controlled by 
the family) to act for the best interests of the compa-
ny. From the perspective of the investors and non-
controlling shareholders, it could means stricter and 
or more efficient appointment and evaluation 
process of Board of Commissioners. From regulator 
point of view, more regulation and or more effective 
law-enforcement is necessary to ensure that the 
Board of Commissioners role is optimal. 
Nevertheless, this research has several limita-
tions, which need to be considered when interpret-
ing the results of this research. One of the limita-
tions is that this research was unable to trace the 
ultimate owners of some companies since the com-
panies are owned by foreign entities. Data on these 
foreign entities is essential to find out the real ulti-
mate owner the Indonesia companies. In addition, 
this research only used secondary data in the as-
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sessment of the effectiveness of the board of com-
missioners. It means that the degree of accuracy of 
the data is not guarantees. Therefore, future re-
search could consider the use of primary data in the 
measurement of the effectiveness of the board of 
commissioners. 
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